Confirmation via Analogue Simulation:  What Dumb Holes Can Tell us About Gravity by Dardashti, Radin et al.
Confirmation via Analogue Simulation:
What Dumb Holes Could Tell us About Gravity
Radin Dardashti∗1, Karim The´bault†1, and Eric Winsberg ‡2
1Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilians Universita¨t Munich
2Philosophy Department, University of South Florida
August 6, 2014
Abstract
In this paper we argue for the existence of analogue simulation as a novel form
of scientific inference with the potential to be confirmatory. This notion is distinct
from the modes of analogical reasoning detailed in the literature, and draws inspi-
ration from fluid dynamical ‘dumb hole’ analogues to gravitational black holes.
For that case, which is considered in detail, we defend the claim that the phenom-
ena of gravitational Hawking radiation could be confirmed in the case that its
counterpart is detected within experiments conducted on diverse realisations of
the analogue model. A prospectus is given for further potential cases of analogue
simulation in contemporary science.
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1 Introduction
Philosophical analysis of science is always, at least partially, held hostage to the for-
tunes of scientific practice. As the ways in which scientists do science evolve, so must
the models of science put forward by philosophers, else the discipline will inevitably
decline into irrelevance. Yet, mere empty imitation would be no more constructive a
pursuit. To remain relevant the philosophy of science must retain its normative role
regarding scientific practice, even as this practice evolves. Here we will articulate a re-
finement and extension of existent analysis of the role of analogies in science (Keynes
1921; Hesse 1964; Hesse 1966; Bartha 2010; Bartha 2013) inspired by fluid mechanical
‘dumb hole’ analogues to gravitational black holes (Moncrief 1980; Unruh 1981; Nov-
ello, Visser, and Volovik 2002; Barcelo´, Liberati, Visser, et al. 2005; Unruh 2008). Our
central claim, which we take to be both bold and well founded, is that this case exem-
plifies a notion of analogue simulation that, unlike other species of analogical reasoning,
has the potential to provide a conduit for confirmation. Trading on a robust syntactic
isomorphism between the relevant modelling frameworks, analogue simulation allows
certain inaccessible phenomenology in the target system to be probed by experimen-
tation on the analogue. Given further model-external and empirically grounded argu-
ments, this then allows us to ‘confirm’ the existence of novel phenomenology in the
target system via the observation of its correlate in the analogue. The potential impor-
tance of this claim is particularly startling in the context of our chosen example since
Hawking radiation is among the gravitational phenomena that ‘dumb holes’ have the
capacity to simulate, and by our lights confirm. Thus, if our analysis is correct, the
quantum phenomenology of black holes is potentially within reach of contemporary
experimental research in analogue gravity (Carusotto, Fagnocchi, Recati, Balbinot, and
Fabbri 2008).
Our arguments regarding confirmation via analogue simulation do, however, cut
both ways. Given the requirement for additional model-external and empirically
grounded arguments, on its own the analogue simulation of some phenomena is not
taken to be confirmatory. Thus, claims made in the literature (Weinfurtner, Tedford,
Penrice, Unruh, and Lawrenc 2013) regarding the ‘verification’ of classical aspects
of Hawking radiation must, for the moment, be treated carefully. On our analysis,
confirmation of Hawking radiation via analogue simulation can only be established
given the acceptance of a chain of reasoning involving universality arguments in com-
bination with diverse realisations of the counterpart effect. These stringent conditions
provide both the normative thrust of our analysis of the case in hand and a framework
for the investigation of further cases. In general terms, our aim in what follows is to
establish the existence of a distinct notion of analogue simulation, and then to provide
conditions for this mode of scientific inference to be confirmatory. Whether or not
there exist cases in which these conditions in fact obtain remains to be seen: further
progress in empirical science is needed before one could justifiably claim confirmation
of Hawking radiation via analogue simulation.
In the following Section 2 we will briefly review the physical background necessary
for a basic understanding of: Hawking radiation in semi-classical gravity (§2.1); the
modelling of sound in fluids (§2.2); and the acoustic analogue model of Hawking radi-
ation (§2.3). Section 3 then contains explication of analogue simulation and our claim
that it can provide a means for confirmation. In the first subsection (§3.1) we review
the traditional notion of analogical reasoning, introduce a framework for understand-
ing analogue simulation, and then contrast the two. In the following subsection (§3.2)
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we deal with the problem of justifying the inferences necessary for analogue simula-
tion to enable confirmation. Our key idea is that in certain circumstances predictions
concerning inaccessible phenomena can be confirmed via an analogue simulation in
a different system. As we shall see, one is only justified in making such claims once
one has established additional empirically grounded and model-external arguments
for the accuracy and robustness of the relevant modelling frameworks and syntactic
isomorphism within the domains involved. We conclude Section 3 with a recapitula-
tion of the key distinctions and their relevance to issues of confirmation (§3.3). The
problems of experimental realisation of Hawking radiation (§4.1) and of finding the
relevant model-external, empirically grounded arguments for the dumb hole/black
hole case (§4.2) then become our main occupation. In completion of our argument,
we present the case for the dumb hole/black hole correspondence offering us the
possibility for confirmation of Hawking radiation via analogue simulation (§4.3). We
conclude by offering a prospectus for extension of the idea of analogue simulation
to other areas of science, and give a short sketch of one case of particularly obvious
relevance (§5).
2 Physical Background
2.1 Hawking Radiation in Semiclassical Gravity
In this section we will give a brief overview of the basis behind Hawking’s famous cal-
culation demonstrating that black holes are associated with a particle flux connected
with a characteristic ‘black hole temperature’ (Hawking 1975). Before we do this we
should note that a number of rich and important interpretational issues regarding
such Hawking radiation are yet to be fully resolved. Most troublingly, the sense in
which the radiation is localisable to the interior of the black hole, the event horizon, or
the exterior of the black hole, is far from clear. Hawking’s calculation does not provide
a causal mechanism for the radiation and thus, to a degree, renders the phenomena
rather mysterious. This notwithstanding, the original thermal model for Hawking
radiation has proved ‘remarkably robust’ under the inclusion of various complicating
factors (Leonhardt and Philbin 2008; Thompson and Ford 2008), and thus can be taken
as sufficient for our purposes.
Our starting point is a semi-classical approach to gravity where we consider a
quantum field within a fixed spacetime background. We will follow the standard
treatment1 and consider the simplest possible model with a scalar field φ considered
in 1+1 Minkowskian background. The classical wave equation for a free scalar field is
simply given by gab∇a∇bφ = 0 where the scalar field is a quantum operator, i.e., obeys
the canonical equal-time commutation relations and acts on a suitably constructed
Hilbert space. We then expand the scalar field in a basis of orthonormal plane wave
solutions:
φ =
∫
dω(aω fω + a†ω f
∗
ω) (1)
where fω = 1√2 e
−i(ωt−kx) and aω, a†ω are operators now satisfying [aω′ , a†ω] = δ(ω′−ω),
for some frequency ω and real constant k. The operators a†ω and aω can thus be
interpreted as creation and annihilation operators. We can now consider the vacuum
state for the scalar field at past null infinity, J −, to be the ‘in’ state, and define it in
1See (Mukhanov and Winitzki 2007) for elementary introductions.
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the usual way as aω|0〉in = 0 for all ω. It is natural to then also define the number
operator for the ‘in’ state at each frequency ω as Ninω = a†ωaω.
Now, consider an alternative set of solutions pω which form a complete orthonor-
mal basis and with respect to which we can also expand the scalar field:
φ =
∫
dω(bωpω + b†ωp
∗
ω) (2)
with [bω′ , b†ω] = δ(ω′ − ω). We use these creation and annihilation operators defined
in this new basis to specify the properties of the ‘out’ state at future null infinity,
J +, via bω|0〉out = 0, and Noutω = b†ωbω. Since the massless scalar field is completely
determined by its Cauchy data on either of the surfaces J − or J +, it can be expressed
in the form (1) or (2) everywhere. This means that we can transform the fω solutions
in terms of the pω solutions, and vice versa, via the Bogoliubov transformations:
fω =
∫
dω′(α∗ωω′ pω′ − βωω′ p∗ω′) pω =
∫
dω′(αωω′ fω′ + βωω′ f ∗ω′) (3)
where αωω′ and βωω′ are the Bogoliubov coefficients given by the inner products
αωω′ = (pω, fω′) and βωω′ = −(pω, f ∗ω′). Similarly, the Bogoliubov coefficients relate
the relevant mode operators to each other, e.g.
bω =
∫
dω′(α∗ωω′aω′ − β∗ωω′a†ω′). (4)
These results give us the basis to calculate the expectation value of the out number
operator for the in vacuum state:
in〈0|(Noutω )|0〉in = in〈0|b†ωbω|0〉in =
∫
dω′|βωω′ |2 (5)
Thus, even in this simple model for semi-classical gravity we can see that the initial
vacuum state of a scalar field in a classical spacetime need not appear as a vacuum
state to observers at positive null infinity: it may contain a flux of ‘out-particles’ which
one can calculate simply by determining the relevant coefficient βωω′ . In the case
where the two solutions are related to each other by a Lorentz transformation, both
observers associated with the solutions will of course agree on the number of particles
observed and (5) will vanish.
What Hawking’s calculation (Hawking 1975, pp. 204-213) shows is that, for a
spacetime which features the establishment of an event horizon via gravitational col-
lapse leading to a black hole, one can derive the asymptotic form of the relevant
coefficients βωω′ , and show that it depends only upon the surface gravity of the black
hole and not the details of the gravitational collapse.2 We can define surface gravity,
κ, in terms of the magnitude of the acceleration, with respect to Killing time, of a
stationary zero angular momentum particle just outside the horizon (Jacobson 1996).
This is, more intuitively put, the force per unit mass that must be applied at infinity in
order to hold the particle on its path. For a nonrotating neutral black hole the surface
gravity is given by 14M , where M is the black hole mass. The role of surface gravity in
2In essence the calculation follows the same lines as that for the scalar field φ in 1+1 Minkowskian
space, only the fields are also expanded for the surface defined by the event horizon. Importantly one
does not need to consider a quantum field in a curved spacetime since the field operators are only
evaluated in the asymptotic regime which is presumed to be flat.
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black hole thermodynamics is almost identical to that of temperature in conventional
thermodynamics. In fact, we define the black hole temperature, TBH, in terms of the
surface gravity. Hawking’s calculation thus gives a general demonstration that there is
a connection between the intrinsic thermodynamic properties of a (non-eternal) black
hole (or at least its horizon) and a non-zero particle flux at late times. The precise
relation takes the form:
〈NBlack Holeω 〉 =
1
e
2piω
h¯κ − 1
TBH = h¯κ/2pi (6)
where we now simply refer to the evaluation of the expectation value of the late time
particle number operator relative to the initial vacuum as the ‘black hole’ particle flux.
We thus see that the basis behind Hawking’s derivation of Hawking radiation is a very
general one: it requires us only to consider simple features of quantum vacuum states
when evaluated in classical spacetime backgrounds which feature Killing horizons.
It is a kinematical effect not a dynamical one. The Einstein equation is not used
anywhere in the calculation. As noted above, such a derivation of what is, after
all, a highly non-trivial physical effect seems a little unsatisfactory from a causal and
explanatory view point. However, for our purpose of investigating analogue models
of Hawking radiation it will prove best to think about the gravitational derivation in
precisely such general and non-microcausal terms.
2.2 Modelling Sound in Fluids
Sound is generally understood as a small vibratory or wavelike disturbance in a
medium. Classical physics deals with such acoustic phenomena in both fluids and
solids and, within certain realms of application, gives an empirically adequate de-
scription. A simple but powerful classical acoustic model (Landau and Lifshitz 1987,
§64) is that where the fluid is taken as a continuous, compressible, inviscid medium
and sound is understood as a longitudinal oscillatory motion with small amplitude
within the medium. Since the fluid in such a model is treated as a continuous medium,
‘points’ within it are really volume elements that are presumed to contain a very large
number of fluid molecules. The volume elements are taken to be very small with re-
spect to the overall fluid volume, and very large with respect to the inter-molecular
distances, meaning that the model is only valid in a particular window of applicablity
determined by the size of the fluid and relevant molecular distances. The first funda-
mental equation within this model of a fluid is the continuity equation. This is simply
an expression of the conservation of matter, and takes the form:
∂ρ
∂t
+∇ · (ρ~v) = 0 (7)
where ρ is the mass density of the fluid at a particular point, and ~v is the velocity of
the fluid volume element. A third quantity, in addition to density and velocity, that we
use to characterise the fluid is the pressure, p. The total force due to the surrounding
fluid acting on a unit of fluid – i.e. a fluid ‘particle’ – is given by −∇p and this,
by Newton’s second law, must be equal to the rate of change in velocity of the fluid
particle relative to space. These considerations lead us to the second fundamental
equation, the Euler equation:
ρ
(∂~v
∂t
+ (~v · ∇)~v
)
= −∇p (8)
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The simultaneous solution of these two equations gives us a basic model for the en-
tire fluid flow, which is characterised in a given situation by the triple of functions
ρ(x, y, z, t), p(x, y, z, t) and ~v(x, y, z, t).
We understand a sound wave in terms of an alternate compression and rarefaction
at each point in the fluid, and can produce a model for sound traveling through a fluid
in terms of the movement of small fluctuations around the equilibrium density and
pressure. Explicitly we can consider linearized fluctuations around the exact solutions
of the form:
ρ(t, x, y, z) = ρ0(t, x, y, z) + eρ1(t, x, y, z) + ...
p(t, x, y, z) = p0(t, x, y, z) + ep1(t, x, y, z) + ...
~v(t, x, y, z) = ~v0(t, x, y, z) + e~v1(t, x, y, z) + ...
The equations of motion of the fluctuations described by (ρ1, p1,~v1) is then precisely
the model for sound propagation in fluids. Such a model (given additional simplifying
assumptions) allows us to reproduce a number of important fluid acoustic phenomena
such as resonance and reflection/refraction of sound waves in mediums composed of
homogenous layers of different fluids (Landau and Lifshitz 1987, §65-81) .
As emphasised already, the model’s applicability depends crucially upon the fluid
volume, volume unit size, and inter-molecular distances all being orders of magnitude
apart. Further limits on the applicability are also given by the speed at which both the
sound wave and the fluid itself are travelling: if either of these are comparable to the
speed of light then a relativistic fluid dynamical model would be needed (Landau and
Lifshitz 1987, §134). Now, the point crucial to our analysis is that even if we assume
that in these respects the model is within its domain of applicability, there is still scope
for it to need modification due to quantum effects. If we consider a Bose-Einstein
condensate (realised, for example in terms of a superfluid such as liquid He4 close to
absolute zero) then certain assumptions of our simple model for sound propagation in
fluids necessarily breakdown, but certain do not. In particular, within certain regimes,
the quantum field corresponding to the Bose-Einstein condensate can be separated
into a bulk flow component and linearized fluctuations. We can then still treat the
bulk as an essentially classical, macroscopic fluid similar to those discussed above,3
but we now treat the linearized fluctuations (i.e. sound) as fundamentally quantum
mechanical. That is, under certain conditions, for certain very low temperature fluids,
even if the bulk fluid flow is still treated classically, it becomes appropriate to treat the
elementary excitations as quanta of the sound wave – i.e. as phonons akin to those
used in the quantum mechanical descriptions of sound in crystalline solids. This is
a strikingly similar type of semi-classical approximation to that made by Hawking in
the context of black holes as discussed above. In the next section we will see that the
similarity between acoustic and gravitational models can, in certain circumstances, be
arranged so that they have exactly the same mathematical structure. This will lead the
way to the introduction of the notion of Analogue Simulation in Section 3.
3In fact the bulk fluid equations can be shown to reduce to a continuity equation plus an Euler
equation which are completely equivalent to those of a classical inviscid fluid apart from the existence
of the quantum potential term in the latter (Barcelo´, Liberati, Visser, et al. 2005, p.60).
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2.3 The Acoustic Analogue Model of Hawking Radiation
Following (Barcelo´, Liberati, Visser, et al. 2005), let us consider a simple model for
a classical fluid along the lines discussed above (i.e., a continuous, compressible, in-
viscid medium in a non-relativistic regime), but with the additional assumptions that
the fluid is barotropic and locally irrotational. Barotropic simply means the pressure is
a function of the density (or vice versa), and so equates to imposing the condition
p = p(ρ). Locally irrotational means that their are no vortices in the fluid and equates
to imposing the condition ∇×~v = 0, which implies ~v = ∇ψ, where we have intro-
duced the velocity potential ψ. The barotropic and irrotational conditions allow us to
much simplify Euler’s equation so that it reduces to a form of the Bernoulli equation.
We can then consider the linearisation of the solutions to this equation of motion for
the entire fluid about a background, (ρ0, p0,ψ0),
ρ(t, x) = ρ0(t, x) + eρ1(t, x) + ...
p(t, x) = p0(t, x) + ep1(t, x) + ...
ψ(t, x) = ψ0(t, x) + eψ1(t, x) + ...
Again we identify the sound waves in the fluids with the fluctuations (ρ1, p1,ψ1) about
the background, which is interpreted as bulk fluid motion. The linearised version of
the continuity equation (together with the barotropic condition) then allows us to
write the equation of motion for the fluctuations as :
∂
∂t
(
ρ0
c2sound
(
∂ψ1
∂t
+ ~v0 · ∇ψ1)
)
= ∇ ·
(
ρ0∇ψ1 − ρ0~v0c2sound
(
∂ψ1
∂t
+ ~v0 · ∇ψ1)
)
(9)
This equation can be rewritten as:
1√−g
∂
∂xµ
(
√−ggµν ∂
∂xν
ψ1) = 0, (10)
where we have defined the acoustic metric
gacousticµν =
ρ0
csound
 −(c
2
sound − v20)
... −(v0)j
. . . · . . .
−(v0)i ... δij
 (11)
Note that (10) reduces to the simple free scalar field equation we considered in Section
2.1 for a 1+ 1-Minkowski metric. We thus see that the propagation of sound in a fluid
can be understood as being governed by an acoustic metric of the form gµν. The acous-
tic perturbations couple only to the effective acoustic metric and not to the physical
spacetime metric which describes the spacetime in which the fluid exists. Formally the
acoustic metric describes a (3+1)-dimensional Lorentzian (pseudo-Riemannian) geom-
etry and it depends algebraically on the density, velocity of flow, and local speed of
sound in the fluid meaning it is constrained to have at most three degrees of freedom
per point in spacetime.
The close similarity between the acoustic case and gravity can be seen immediately
if we consider the Schwarzschild metric in Painleve-Gullstrand coordinates (within
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which the Schwarzschild geometry is written such a way that space is flat, even though
spacetime is curved). This takes the form:
gSchwarzschildµν =
 −(c
2
0 − 2GMr )
... −
√
2GM
r ~rj
. . . · . . .
−
√
2GM
r ~ri
... δij
 (12)
This similarity can be transformed into an isomorphism (up to a factor) under certain
very specific conditions. Explicitly, following (Novello, Visser, and Volovik 2002), we
make the restrictions that: i) csound is a position-independent constant; ii) the fluid
moves radially with a velocity profile vfluid = 1√r ; and iii) the background density ρ0 is
a position-independent constant. Given these requirements, which are experimentally
realisable, our fluid metric becomes such that it is proportional to the Schwarzschild
metric above. The role of the black hole event horizon is now played by the effective
acoustic horizon where the inward flowing magnitude of the radial velocity of the
fluid exceeds the speed of sound. The black hole is replaced by a dumb hole.
Thus we have a methodology for simulating (in a sense to be discussed more fully
shortly) a classical black hole using fluid mechanics. This is in of itself a rather im-
pressive result. However, one is able to stretch the fluid/gravity analogy even further
and consider both classical and quantum mechanical acoustic phenomena within the
fluid as analogies to radiative phenomena within a black hole spacetime. The relevant
calculation for the acoustic case proceeds in precisely the same manner as the Hawk-
ing calculation considered above only with the scalar field corresponding to sound,
and in this case leads to a relation between the late time sound flux associated with
the dumb hole, and the ‘surface gravity’ of the acoustic horizon. The latter is simply
equal to the physical acceleration of the fluid as it crosses the event horizon, afluid, and
is given by an expression of the form:
κ = csound| ∂v∂n | = afluid (13)
Where ∂∂n is the normal derivative of the fluid velocity as it crosses the event horizon.
Given this, we can make numerical estimates for the acoustic Hawking Temperature,
T acousticH , of a dumb hole for any given fluid. And since, unlike for black holes, we have
experimental access to fluids, it means that there is in principle a means for testing
the predicted Hawking radiation of a dumb hole.
We will return to the various interesting issues surrounding experimental obser-
vation of Hawking radiation via analogue models in Section 4. There we will consider
the extant experiments to test for fluid mechanical Hawking radiation, and also give
some details regarding possible future experiments using different analogical mod-
els. We will also consider the implications of the short length scales breakdown of
the analogue models for our understanding of the possible Planckian breakdown of
the gravitation model. This will finally lead into a discussion of Hawking radiation
in the context of universality, and allow us to understand precisely what dumb holes
could tell us about gravity. Before then, in the following section, we will consider the
implications of the analogue models we have been discussing for the general analysis
of simulation and analogy in physical theory.
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3 Simulation and Analogy in Physical Theory
3.1 Analogical Reasoning and Analogue Simulation
Arguments by analogy are very common in both science and philosophy. An oft-
cited example is an argument offered by the Scottish Philosopher Thomas Reid for the
existence of life on other planets:
Thus, we may observe a very great similitude between this earth which we
inhabit, and the other planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury.
They all revolve round the sun, as the earth does, although at different
distances, and in different periods. They borrow all their light from the
sun, as the earth does. Several of them are known to revolve round their
axes like the earth, and, by that means, must have a like succession of
day and night. Some of them have moons, that serve to give them light
in the absence of the sun, as our moon does to us. They are all, in their
motions, subject to the same law of gravitation as the earth is. From all this
similitude, it is not unreasonable to think, that those planets may, like our
earth, be the habitation of various orders of living creatures. There is some
probability in this conclusion from analogy (Reid and Hamilton 1850, pp.
16-17)
In light of this quotation, let us pose a simple question: are the inferences one can
make about black hole Hawking radiation by drawing on observations of dumb holes
of the same kind as the inferences one can make about the existence of life on other
planets by drawing on observations of life on Earth? We think not, and to make this
clear we would like to draw a distinction between a notion of analogical reasoning, on
the one hand, and a second notion of analogue simulation, on the other.
The literature on analogical reasoning is fairly extensive, with particularly note-
worthy contributions by Keynes (Keynes 1921), Hesse (Hesse 1964; Hesse 1966) and
Bartha (Bartha 2010; Bartha 2013). Drawing on this literature (in particular (Bartha
2013)), we can characterize analogical inferences in the following way: First, call the
less accessible system about which we hope to make inferences the target, T, and call
the more accessible system we hope to make use of in analogy the source, S. An
argument using analogical reasoning then takes the following form (Bartha 2013):
P1. S is similar to T in certain known respects.
P2. S has some further feature Q.
C. Therefore, T also has the feature Q, or some feature Q? that is
similar to Q.
This seems to fit the Reid case rather well.
Following Hempel (Hempel 1965), the literature also recognizes a particular kind
of argument by analogy, what Hempel called nomic isomorphism. Hempel character-
ized this kind of reasoning as a situation in which S and T are each governed by a set
of laws, between which there is a syntactic isomorphism. When talking about syntactic
isomorphism ‘[t]he essential idea is that the two sets of physical laws have a common
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mathematical form and may be obtained by assigning different physical interpreta-
tions to the symbols that appear in that common form’ (Bartha 2010, pp. 208-9).4
These ideas offer a solid starting point for the philosophical analysis of the dumb
hole case; however, several amendments and clarifications are required.
One central recommendation is that Hempel’s notion of nomic isomorphism, which
is a sub-species of analogical reasoning, should be replaced with a broader concept of
analogue simulation. Analogue simulation, as we understand it, can occur even when
the syntactic isomorphism one can identify does not hold between the laws govern-
ing the two systems in generality. This can be seen clearly in the dumb hole case
since, strictly speaking, the equations on either side of the isomorphism are not laws.
To establish a full nomic connection we would have to relate the laws governing the
fundamental dynamics of quantum phenomena at the horizon of a black hole (i.e.
the relevant equation from a prospective theory of quantum gravity) to those govern-
ing the fluid flow (i.e. at the very least the full Navier-Stokes equations). A doubly
infeasible task.
Nevertheless, there is a syntactic isomorphism to be exploited in the dumb holes
case, and we think it is best understood as holding between two very particular mod-
elling frameworks, each with narrower scope than genuine laws. The question is not of
an isomorphism between the laws of fluids and the laws of quantum gravity on the
other. Rather, there is an isomorphism between a particular adequate way of mod-
elling a special class of fluid setups and a particular adequate way of modelling the
behaviour of quantum fields near a black hole horizon.
With this in mind let us introduce some vocabulary concerning models. We build
models using a modelling framework, M. The ideal pendulum is a modelling frame-
work for modelling particular pendulums. The two-body, point-particle modelling
framework is good for modelling planetary orbits under certain conditions. Mod-
elling frameworks almost always involve idealizations, and hence they are usually
adequate only under a certain domain of conditions, D. The domain of conditions un-
der which the ideal pendulum framework is adequate will depend on what we mean
by adequate. In general, adequate means ‘for a particular purpose: accurate to a
certain desired degree.’ People who use and build models have lots of background
knowledge, some of it explicit and some of it tacit, about what domain of conditions
needs to apply before a particular modelling framework is adequate for a particular
purpose and to a particular desired degree of accuracy.
Given the above, we will say that system S provides an analogue simulation of
system T when the following set of conditions obtain:5
Step 1. For certain purposes and to a certain degree of desired accuracy,
modelling framework MS is adequate for modelling system S within
a certain domain of conditions DS.
4We retain Hempel’s ‘syntactic isomorphism’ principally for historical reasons even though it is per-
haps not the ideal terminology for the relationship at hand. The implication is always that the equations
specifying two rather different models (say, the model of a simple pendulum with small displacement
and the model of an RLC circuit) are ‘the same’. This does not mean the equations are identical however.
In an RLC circuit, for example, the equation for the resonance frequency is ω = (LC)− 12 , where L is the
inductance, and C is the capacitance. In a simple pendulum, ω = (Lg)− 12 where L is the length and
g is the acceleration of gravity. Those are not literally the same equation since one relates frequency
to inductance and capacitance, etc. But we can easily see that they have the same structure – they are
‘isomorphic’ in syntax.
5The following is consistent with the account of simulation offered in (Winsberg 2009; Winsberg 2010)
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Step 2. For certain purposes and to a certain degree of desired accuracy,
modelling framework MT is adequate for modelling system T within
a certain domain of conditions DT.
Step 3. There exists exploitable mathematical similarities between the struc-
ture of MS and MT sufficient to define a syntactic isomorphism
robust within the domains DS and DT.
Step 4. We are interested in knowing something about the behaviour of
a system T within the domain of conditions DT, and to a degree
of accuracy and for a purpose consistent with those specified in
Step 2. For whatever reasons, however, we are unable to directly
observe the behaviour of a system T in those conditions to the
degree of accuracy we require.
Step 5. We are, on the other hand, able to study a system S after having put
it under such conditions as will enable us to conclude a statement
of the form:
ClaimS Under conditions DS and to degree of accuracy that will be needed
below, we can for the purpose of employing the reasoning below
assert that a system S will exhibit phenomena PS.
The formal similarities mentioned in Step 3 then allow us to reason from ClaimS to
ClaimT which is of the form:
ClaimT Under conditions DT a system T will exhibit phenomena PT.
As a tool for analysing the structure of contemporary science this notion of simulation
has the following advantages over the Hempelian category of nomic isomorphism.
First, as we have already noted, the requirement that the syntactic isomorphism be
between two sets of laws is too strong to cover most of the interesting cases. It seems
clear that the kind of reasoning involved in dumb hole cases is more in the spirit of
what Hempel had in mind than it is in the spirit of the sort of thing described by
Keynes and Hesse, or of that exemplified by the Reid example. However, the dumb
hole cases are difficult to see as fitting in to the strict set of requirements set out
by Hempel. The relevant fact is not whether there is a formal relationship between
two sets of laws, but rather whether such a relationship obtains between two suitably
useful modelling frameworks.
Second, we think analogue simulation is better seen as distinct from analogical
reasoning than as a sub-species of analogical reasoning. This is because the strength
or quality of the inferences one can draw by analogue simulation is much greater
than is that of those which can be drawn via analogical reasoning. We think analogue
simulations can provide much stronger support for the conclusions we draw from
them – this is of course the basis behind the key confirmation claims discussed at
length in the following sections. Furthermore, we hope that our characterization of
analogue simulation emphasizes the extent to which what we are dealing with is not
simply a form of abstract argument, but rather a technique for learning about the
world by manipulating it. It should be obvious, for example, that employing dumb
holes to learn about Hawking radiation has a lot more in common with experiment
than does Reid’s armchair speculations about life on other planets. Step 5, above, after
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all, will require us to manipulate a system S so as to put it in the set of conditions that
allow us to make the inference to [ClaimT].
Third, we find it attractive that it is an easy consequence of our characterization of
analogue simulation that analogue simulation and computer simulation come out as
two species of the same genus: simulation.6 On our view, the main difference between
computer simulation and analogue simulation is simply that in computer simulation,
the system S is a programmable digital computer, and the reasons that it meets the
conditions articulated in Step 2 is that it has been programmed precisely so as to meet
those conditions. The programmable digital computer is such a powerful scientific tool
precisely because it can be so easily prepared in such a way. We find this consequence
attractive, in part, because we find that it accords nicely with scientific practice and
the intuitions of working scientists, who view the kind of work exemplified by dumb
hole studies as easily comparable to computer simulations. We will comment further
on the comparison with computer simulation in §3.3, once the major argument of the
paper concerning confirmation has been introduced.
3.2 Confirmation via Analogue Simulation
The groundwork has now been laid for us to make our most controversial claim: that,
in certain circumstances, analogue simulation can provide inductive support for a hy-
pothesis regarding the target system, on the basis of empirical evidence regarding the
source system – in other words, it can give us confirmation. It should be noted, that
for the purpose of the present analysis we will not be concerned with the possibility
of characterising cases of analogue simulation in terms of a particular philosophical
model of confirmation.7 Rather, we will propose that certain cases of analogue sim-
ulation should plausibly be counted amongst the explananda for which the models
of confirmation are intended to provide the explanans. From our perspective, if it
proves that a philosophical model of confirmation cannot accommodate confirmation
via analogue simulation at all, then this would be as much a problem for the model,
as it would for analogue simulation.
That said, our aim here is emphatically not to propose a new category of confirma-
tion based on analogue simulation merely on the basis of the intuitions and practices
of ‘working scientists’. Thus, we seek to carve a middle course between the normative
and descriptive: neither assuming an abstract model of what should be counted by
scientists as confirmatory, nor transcribing from their practice, a model of what actu-
ally is. We claim that philosophy of science is hostage to scientific practice and thus
as the latter evolves, so must the former. That is, insofar as scientists develop novel
methods for confirming hypotheses, our own models of confirmation must adapt to
them. However, on our view, such novel practices must still be subjected to detailed
philosophical analysis, and the cogency of claims of confirmation via novel methods
tested all the more robustly on the grounds of their novelty. This is best done without
prejudicing the analysis by adopting a particular account of confirmation. Only then,
6See (Winsberg 2010) for more on this point.
7Major approaches to confirmation theory (according to a relatively standard classification) are: con-
firmation by instances, hypothetico-deductivism, and probabilistic (Bayesian) approaches. See (Crupi
2013) for more details in general, and (Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg, and Hartmann 2011) for work on ap-
plying the Bayesian framework in the context of analogical relationships. A forthcoming paper (Dard-
ashti, Hartmann, The´bault, and Winsberg ) will explore the foundations of analogue simulation from a
Bayesian persecutive.
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if the claim that a novel scientific practice is confirmatory survives such an analysis,
can it be claimed that a philosophical model of confirmation needs to accommodate
the new confirmatory mechanism.
Things of course also cut the other way. Nothing in the proposed methodology
rules out the possibility that the scientist’s claims (regarding the novel methods and
confirmation) might either partially or entirely fail to live up to careful philosophical
scrutiny. Our analysis, in such a case, would then licence normative arguments against
the scientific intuitions. What is more, it could also be used to criticise philosophical
models of confirmation for being overly permissive, rather than excluding new phe-
nomena. In what follows we will, in fact, detail the extent to which ‘confirmation via
analogue simulation’ can fail to hold. Thus, our analysis will also serve as a basis to
identify cases which should not count amongst the explananda of models of confirma-
tion, and we believe it is entirely possible that the existing philosophical models might
be troubled by accommodating analogue simulation too easily.
The natural starting point for the discussion of confirmation in our specific case is
an argument given by Bartha (Bartha 2013) against analogical reasoning being confir-
matory. This argument is based upon a specific philosophical model of confirmation
– Bayesian confirmation theory. However, in line with the considerations above, such
a model will not be assumed in our positive story. From a Bayesian perspective it
seems reasonable to assume that evidence for a hypothesis can count as confirma-
tory only if the probability of the hypothesis given the evidence together with certain
background assumptions is larger than the probability of the hypothesis given only
the background assumptions. Bartha contends that we should take the information
encapsulated in an analogical argument to already be part of the background knowl-
edge, and thus the probability of a hypothesis regarding the target system will be
identical before and after finding any empirical evidence regarding the source sys-
tem. It seems reasonable to accept this argument for the case in which the target and
source are merely connected by analogical reasoning. However, when an analogical
connection is established via analogue simulation there are good reasons to doubt the
Bartha argument: prima facie, we do have the collection of new evidence – i.e. evi-
dence which is not part of that background knowledge. Within our characterisation,
this new evidence feature is found precisely when we probe the phenomenology of
the source system to gain new evidence regarding an exemplar of the target system
(i.e. Step 5). Of course, that this new evidence really is evidence relevant to the target
system is only the case given the all important assumptions regarding the accuracy of
the modelling frameworks and the robustness of the syntactic isomorphism (i.e. Steps
1-3). And clearly such assumptions are open to question without further support.
Moreover, how can we be justified in thinking that the syntactic isomorphism will still
hold within domains where we do not, by assumption, have any evidence that the
modelling framework relevant to the target system is accurate?
Let us be more explicit regarding the required structure. The claim is that new
evidence for the phenomena PS as predicted by the model MS of the system S, can
confirm the existence of the analogous phenomena PT, as predicted by the model MT
of target system T. For such a claim to be justified not only must equivalence be
established between the mathematical descriptions of PS and PT, but we must also
have evidence that both modelling frameworks will be accurate within the domain in
which the phenomena are found. The problem of course is that it is not obvious how
the accuracy of the framework MT within the domain DT could be established empir-
ically with regard to the phenomena PT, since we have assumed this phenomena to be
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inaccessible! Rather we need reasons external to the particular modelling frameworks
at hand to justify the robustness of the formal correspondence.
We can see how this can be done as follows. Given certain explicit assumptions
A = A1, ..., An about the model MT of target system T, we are able to derive PT.
These assumptions are based on some additional implicit assumptions I = I1, ..., Im
of the sort ‘property X of system T does not influence the derivation’. These implicit
assumptions are not “premises” of the derivation but are, if true, the justifications for
the use of the assumptions A. Now system S is modelled in such a way as to realize
the assumptions A′ = A′1, ..., A′n, in model MS. These assumptions are syntactically
isomorphic to the assumptions A in model MT. Therefore the derivation of PS goes
through within model MS as it did in MT and we have a mathematical descriptions of
the relevant phenomena which are suitably isomorphic. The set of underlying implicit
assumptions I ′ = I′1, ..., I′k for model MS can possibly be different from those of model
MT and no syntactic isomorphism between the set of assumptions are needed here
since they are not used in the derivation.
With respect to system S one has control over the realization of the assumptions
A′ necessary for the derivation, i.e. the required properties can to some extent be
realized by construct. However, if system T is inaccessible it remains an open question
whether the assumptions are actually realized there. The reason for this is that the
implicit assumptions I ′ justifying the assumptions A′ in model MS are different from
those justifying the assumptionsA in model MT. And knowledge about the I ′s do not
necessarily entail any information about the implicit assumptions in the other system,
since a priori these are independent. That is, in the worst case, one models in system
S something which is not realized in target system T.
So unless we have some reason to relate the implicit assumptions in both systems
with each other there is no reason why observation of the phenomenon in one system
should entail empirical evidence for the other. However, it is our claim, that in the
case of analogue models of black hole Hawking radiation a relation between these
implicit assumptions can be formulated which can be empirically tested and so build
an empirical bridge between the target and source system.
Let us illustrate this with a simple example before discussing the dumbholes more
closely in the next section. There is a syntactic isomorphism between Newton’s Law
of Gravity FN = G m1m2r2 and Coulomb’s law FC = K
q1q2
r2 .
8 Let us, for the purpose
of the argument, assume that Newton’s law describes our inaccessible target system
while we are able to test Coulomb’s law. First note, how analogue simulation can
obtain between systems with radically different ontologies. In one case we consider
the strength of the interaction between charged objects while in the other case it is
the strength of the interaction between massive bodies. But why should the force law
between massive and charged objects be syntactically isomorphic?
One crucial formal feature behind the syntactic isomorphism is the dependence
of the force law on the distance r of the two bodies. In both cases we have a 1/r2-
dependence. One assumption that goes into the derivation of both laws and which
gives rise to this dependence is the dimensionality of space. One can show that if
space were to be 2-dimensional the force law in both cases would go as 1/r while in
four space dimensions the laws would go as 1/r3. It is only in three space dimen-
8This example serves the purpose of exemplifying some of the aspects of analogue simulation but can
actually not be applied to our framework since Coulomb’s law describes static interactions only and so
could not be used to test e.g. planetary motion.
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sions that the 1/r2-relation obtains.9 This illustrates nicely how specific features, the
dimensionality of space, common to both systems can lead to a syntactic isomorphism
despite them having radically different ontologies.
The existence of such common features also serves as a guide to the conditions for
the accuracy of the modelling frameworks and robustness of the isomorphism within
the relevant domains. It is, in fact, clear from modern particle physics that not all
fundamental interactions follow a 1/r2-dependence in three spatial dimensions.10 In
particular the weak nuclear force does not. Formally such features can be understood
in the framework of quantum field theory (QFT) as relating to the mass of the force
mediating particles: QFT interactions are always mediated via so-called gauge bosons
and a 1/r2-dependence obtains only if we have massless-mediating particles. The
gauge bosons of gravity and electromagnetism (the graviton and photon respectively)
are massless, thus we get a 1/r2-dependence. On the other hand the mediating bosons
for the weak forces (W and Z bosons) are massive, so the r-dependence is more com-
plex.11 The description of interactions via QFT is empirically well confirmed, and thus
this argument towards the level of generality of the 1/r2-dependence is not merely the-
oretical. It gives empirically grounded and model-external arguments for the robustness
of the syntactic isomorphism between the Newtonian and Coulomb modelling frame-
works. Such additional knowledge coming from an underlying theory does not rule
out the possibility of a breakdown in the syntactic isomorphism entirely, but it does
give reason to insist the assumptions crucial to Steps 1-3 above are well-founded.
We have thus seen that additional knowledge of the underlying physics can give
us reason to believe in the correctness of the underlying implicit assumptions. In the
example considered we had shared explicit assumptions of the sort that both systems
follow the Poisson equation in three space dimensions (for example) and implicit as-
sumptions that the very specific properties of each of these systems do not lead to
a deviation from the law. More precisely, we implicitly assume that the way electric
charges interact is similar enough to the interaction of massive objects so that the 1/r2-
dependence in each case is robust. As we saw this assumption can be supported by
model-external and empirically grounded arguments – let us abbreviate such arguments
as ‘meega’. As we discussed above, the systems T and S differ in terms of the implicit
assumptions. The non-realization of one of the implicit assumptions in the target sys-
tem can lead to a failing of the analogue setup being able to confirm. meega give us a
handle on exactly these implicit assumptions and allow us to bridge in an empirically
justifiable way the reasonableness of the implicit assumptions in the target system. Of
course, this does not rule out the possibility that the violation of some unthought-of
implicit assumption in the target system could lead to the target system not develop-
ing the phenomenon observed in the analogue system. Thus, meega only ever give
us an inductive base for believing in the robustness of the syntactic isomorphism and
accuracy of the modelling frameworks, they do not establish anything tout court.
One might object that the establishment of meega makes the need for the analogue
9Assuming the Poisson equation holds in all dimensions. There are also some other subtleties. See
(Callender 2005) for details.
10There are physical proposals, like the Arkani-Hamed-Dvali-Dimopolous model (Arkani-Hamed, Di-
mopoulos, and Dvali 1998) or the Randall-Sundrum model (Randall and Sundrum 1999), which claim
that there are additional dimensions. In the Randall-Sundrum model the claim that the dimensionality
of space is a common feature of both gravitational and electromagnetic systems is denied: while elec-
tromagnetic interactions are restricted to three space dimensions, gravitational interactions are not. This
shows that there is empirical room for these kind of modifications.
11For a simple treatment of this see Sec.1.4 and 1.5 in (Zee 2010).
15
simulation obsolete. This is not the case, since what meega does is not to replace the
modelling frameworks with an overarching theory but to justify empirically the va-
lidity of the implicit assumptions in each of the systems. As discussed above what a
quantum field theoretic treatment is offering us is not a unifying theory of electromag-
netic and gravitational interactions but constraints on any quantum field theoretical
treatment of these interactions, thereby increasing our degree of believe with respect to
the implicit assumptions and establishing a robustness of the modelling frameworks
used. However, if there were one scientific theory that would cover both domains of
applicability of the modelling frameworks, e.g. a unified theory of all fundamental
forces, then, of course, the analogue simulation as a mean to confirmation becomes
obsolete and we get back to standard theory confirmation by evidence.
So the lesson is, one is only justified in claiming confirmation via analogue sim-
ulation once one has established, via meega, additional reasons for the accuracy of
the modelling frameworks, and robustness of the syntactic isomorphism within the
relevant domains. The key question examined in the remains of this paper is whether
such conditions can be established for the case of dumb holes and black holes. How-
ever, before we enter into this discussion it will be instructive to review the crucial
terminology and distinctions that have been introduced so far.
3.3 Recapitulation
There are three separate distinctions regarding types of scientific inference relevant
to our argument. The first distinction is between ordinary analogical reasoning and
analogue simulation and has already been discussed extensively in §3.1. The second
distinction is between analogue simulation and computer simulation. Although ana-
logical simulation is very much like computer simulation we do not here take them
to be identical. There is a clear and obvious difference between the two in that in the
case of computer simulation the structural similarity that exists between the model
of the target and the model of the source exists precisely because the source system
has been digitally programmed in such a way as to make this isomorphism obtain.
However, there is a strong correspondence between such digital programming, and
the preparation of the analogue model: the preparation of a fluid to formally resem-
ble a black hole is, in a sense, a form of analogue programming (where here we are
using ‘analogue’ in the ‘not digital’ sense of the word). We concede, therefore, that our
claim that analogue simulation can confirm beliefs about the target simulation is not
unrelated to the parallel claim about computer simulation, and we note that the latter
claim is controversial in the literature. See (Beisbart and Norton 2012) for a defence
of the negative claim, and (Parker 2009; Winsberg 2009), for a defence of the positive
claim.
As it so happens, we take the positive side of this debate: since programmed
digital computers are physical systems, a run of such a system gathers novel empirical
evidence, and so surely must in principle be able to provide confirmation. Thus, on
our view, and contra (Beisbart and Norton 2012), computer simulation is not simply
an ‘argument’, and can in principle boost our degree of belief in a hypothesis about
the target system, provided that the relevant background knowledge (concerning the
isomorphism) is in place to support the relevant inference. Of course the run of a
computer simulation will never serve to confirm all of the background knowledge
supporting the claim of an existing structural similarity between source and target.
A computer simulation of a fluid that uses the Navier-Stokes equations to guide its
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construction will never, by itself, confirm the Navier-Stokes equations themselves. But
that does not mean that such a computer simulation cannot confirm, e.g., a scaling
law regarding certain kinds of fluid configurations.12
This argument of course depends crucially upon the inference from the premise
that programmed digital computers are physical systems, to the conclusion that a
run of such a system can gather novel empirical evidence. Since, in such cases, the
novel empirical evidence comes from a physical system whose job it is to perform
calculations that could, in principle, have been carried out by rote on a piece of paper,
a critic might – in support of (Beisbart and Norton 2012) – argue that we do not have
genuinely novel empirical evidence in the sense that matters to confirmation theory.
We believe that even if one accepts critical arguments in this vein, there are still cases
of computer simulation that should plausibly be counted as confirmatory. And the
reason why is, in fact, closely related to the idea of analogue simulation supported by
model-external and empirically grounded arguments (i.e., meega).
In practice much interesting science involves not just computer simulation in iso-
lation, but the gathering of evidence regarding the reliability of the syntactic iso-
morphisms that such simulations exploit. Well-designed computer simulation stud-
ies generally involve a back-and-forth between simulation runs and real-world data
gathering in support of their own background assumptions. Thus, certain cases of
computer simulations involve the activity of providing meega for the background as-
sumptions used in other computer simulation, including, in some cases, themselves.
In such cases, the role of simulation explicitly could not, even in principle, be played
by calculations on a piece of paper, and thus the criticism of the evidence as not gen-
uinely novel, falls short.
Thus, we do, as a matter of fact, think it is very plausible to believe that computer
simulations can confirm certain hypotheses. However, this is not a central claim of this
paper. One can reject the arguments in favour of computer simulations being confirmatory,
but still accept that dumb hole experiments can confirm the existence of Hawking radiation.
This is because of the third, and most important, distinction: the distinction between
generic analogue simulations, on the one hand, and analogue simulation supported
by meega, on the other.
One might suspect that the arguments against computer simulation being confir-
matory might be applicable to a general case of analogue simulation. However, as
we have seen, such arguments are much less plausibly applicable in the case that
computer simulations are engaged in, or supported by meega. Similarly, for the case
analogue simulation supported by meega, the critical argument against the collection
of novel evidence based upon the comparison with pen and paper calculation surely
must fail entirely. In the case of an analogue simulation supported by meega, by def-
inition, there are model external, empirically grounded reasons to believe that novel
phenomenology is being simulated. Thus, the collection of novel evidence is secured
in a sense much stronger than that of either generic computer simulation or analogue
simulation.
A further interesting point relates to the notion, mentioned above, of simulations
12To give a concrete example, it is widely held by astrophysicists that certain computer simulations
carried out in the early 1970s (see for example (Toomre and Toomre 1972)), confirmed the previously
heretical claim that tidal forces that arise when two galaxies collide were responsible for the phenomenon
of galactic tails and bridges. We see no reason to deny this, since novel evidence came from the runs of
of these simulations that rationally raised people’s degrees of belief in the hypothesis. But of course, no
one, on the other hand, would claim that these simulations could confirm the existence of tidal forces.
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which provide their own meega. Such an idea will, in fact, prove to be embodied in
precisely the case of analogue simulation under consideration. The central concern
in this paper is the chain of arguments by which one might reasonably claim that
dumb hole studies could confirm the existence of (gravitational) Hawking radiation.
On our view, confirmation of Hawking radiation via analogue simulation can only
be established given the acceptance of a chain of reasoning involving universality
arguments in combination with diverse realisations of the counterpart effect. These
diverse realizations will thus simultaneously provide the empirical support for the
meega supporting the simulation, and realize the simulations themselves. We will
return to this point in §4.2.
4 The Sound of Silence: Analogical Insights into Gravity
4.1 Experimental Realisation of Analogue Models
The wish to use analogue models to test inaccessible target systems did not grew out
of sheer creativity of the scientists involved but out of necessity. Science has reached
a point where many theoretical ideas can not be tested due to several practical limita-
tions. These limitations can have several reasons. For instance, the technology to test
the theory has not yet been developed, the system that needs to be tested is unreach-
able, there is simply not enough funding to build the experiment, or a combination
of the above. However, practical limitations to test a theory do not make a theory
less scientific, and therefore the question remains of how then to establish confidence
in these theories. In this context, analogue simulations have proved as a promising
alternative and several applications beyond the dumb hole case, whose experimental
realisation we will discuss now, have been proposed. Some further applications will
be discussed in Sect. 5.
If the analogue models of black hole physics were purely hypothetical then their
scientific status would likely be merely that of a fascinating novelty, rather than the
inspiration for an entire sub-field of modern physics. After all, the main problem
with theoretical work concerning black holes is that we have, as yet, no empirical
means of testing the predictions – since we can neither create black holes in the lab,
nor probe them via astrophysical observation. In the spirit of our view of the dumb
hole model as a simulation of a black hole, the situation, if one were not able to
experimentally realise the model, would be like having the correct code for a computer
simulation, but not being able to run it due to unrealistic hardware requirements. A
not particularly useful situation. Here we will briefly survey the practical problem
of detecting Hawking radiation via analogue simulation, and in doing so consider
further models beyond the fluid mechanical dumb hole discussed above.
First let us consider a model along the lines of §2.3 with the flowing through a
nozzle in order to create the deserved acoustic horizon. Following, (Novello, Visser,
and Volovik 2002, p.26) we have that for supersonic flow of a fluid through a nozzle
of radius R, the approximate value of T acousticH is given by the expression:
T acousticH = 1.2× 10−6K
[
csound
1km/s
][
1mm
R
]
(14)
For water this equates to a temperature of the order 10−6 K. Detecting a thermal
phonon spectrum at this temperature while the ambient temperature is approximately
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300 K is entirely impractical, and so clearly water is not going to provide a useful
working fluid for real laboratory experiments of this form. However, there are other
methodologies for setting up the analogue model in which the use of conventional flu-
ids for detecting at least classical aspects of Hawking radiation becomes more practica-
ble (Weinfurtner, Tedford, Penrice, Unruh, and Lawrence 2011; Weinfurtner, Tedford,
Penrice, Unruh, and Lawrenc 2013).
These experiments are based on a proposal by Schu¨tzhold and Unruh (Schu¨tzhold
and Unruh 2002) where surface gravity waves in water tanks are used instead of Un-
ruh’s original proposal of sound waves. The problem for the sound wave proposal is
that the acceleration of fluids to velocities close to the speed of sound leads to turbu-
lences due to shock waves. Once there are turbulences the linearisation assumptions
involved in the derivation of the effect are not realised anymore and experimental con-
trol of these turbulences is too difficult. The new proposal by Schu¨tzhold and Unruh
considers surface waves on shallow water flows. The advantage is that the velocity
of the background flow v and the velocity of the surface waves c are both dependent
on the depth h of the water tanks. More concretely, the velocity of the background
flow goes as v ∝ 1h , while the surface waves velocity goes as c ∝
√
h. So by adding
an obstacle to the water flow, h decreases, and thereby the background flow velocity
increases while the surface wave velocity decreases. If the velocity of the background
flow exceeds the velocity of the surface waves an effective horizon is obtained.13 The
surface waves are effectively ‘blocked’ by the horizon, so nothing can enter the critical
region. In this sense the experiment is a fluid mechanical analogue of a white hole,
i.e. the time inverse of a black hole, for which the same laws hold.
The results of the experiment detailed in (Weinfurtner, Tedford, Penrice, Unruh,
and Lawrenc 2013) imply that the pair-wave creation at the effective white hole hori-
zon has a thermal spectra consistent with that predicted by the Hawking type calcu-
lation: the generated incoming positive mode is converted at the white hole horizon
to positive and negative outgoing modes. And the corresponding amplitudes of the
outgoing modes, i.e. the Bogoliubov coefficients, were measured and the validity of
the thermal spectra according to Hawking checked. The dispersion relations used
are different from the ones assumed by Hawking in his derivation which leads the
authors of the paper to the following conclusion (p.15):
The ratio is thermal despite the different dispersion relation from that used
by Hawking in his black hole derivation. This increases our trust in the ul-
traviolet independence of the effect, and our belief that the effect depends
only on the low frequency, long wavelength aspects of the physics.
We will comment more on such issue regarding the relevance or not of short wave-
length physics shortly. There are two drawbacks of this experiment. First, the ex-
periment considers only the stimulated Hawking Process and not the spontaneous.
Second, only classical aspects of the process are measured in the experiment. The
behaviour for this linear quantum system is dominated by the classical behaviour and
additional quantum correlations of the emitted field excitations are not measured by
the experiment. However, other analogue experiments based on Bose-Einstein con-
densates may be able to take the analogue experiments to the quantum regime.
The fluid mechanical analogy has proved to be only one among a number of pos-
sible realisations for the Hawking phenomena in terms of small oscillations in contin-
13The velocities needed to develop an effective horizon are low and the avoidance of turbulence is
experimentally realisable and is being tested in the experiments.
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uum systems. In general, it seems that there are only two necessary requirements to
reproduce Hawking radiation (Barcelo´, Liberati, Visser, et al. 2005), in that we need:
i) a quantum analogue model with a classical effective background and relativistic
quantum fields living on it; which ii) contains some analogue geometry with some
sort of horizon. Thus far, in addition to sound in a liquid and surface waves in water
tanks, contemporary analogue gravity research (both theoretical and practical) makes
use of: phonons in superfluid liquid helium, atomic Bose-Einstein condensates (BECs)
(Garay, Anglin, Cirac, and Zoller 2000) and degenerate Fermi gases; ‘slow light’ in
moving media; and traveling refractive index interfaces in nonlinear optical media
(see (Carusotto, Fagnocchi, Recati, Balbinot, and Fabbri 2008) for further references).
4.2 Universality and the Hawking Effect
We must now turn the focus of our analysis to a problem of particular importance
for both the reliability of the calculation of the Hawking effect, and our claim that
the relevant analogue gravity models should be understood in terms of the concept
of analogue simulation. In the standard calculation of the Hawking temperature,
which is used in both the gravity and analogue cases, the black hole radiation (or
its analogue) detected at late times (i.e. the outgoing particles) must be taken to
correspond to extremely high frequency radiation at the horizon. This is because of
an exponential gravitational red-shift (or its analogue) that is assumed to take place
near the horizon. The problem with this is that the frequencies in question can in fact
be high enough to make the relevant length scales smaller than those upon which the
semi-classical approximation made in theories being applied are expected to work. For
gravitation this corresponds to Planck-scale lengths at which it is no longer reasonable
to use quantum fields defined upon fixed classical spacetime backgrounds. Such a
‘trans-Planckian’ regime is the dominion of theories of quantum gravity, and is thus
well beyond the domain of applicability of the modelling framework we are using.
This problem with trans-Planckian modes has a direct analogue in the fluids case,
where the breakdown due to neglected quantum gravity effects is paralleled by that
due to the atomic nature of the fluid. Thus, in each case the modelling framework
we are using is in fact, strictly speaking, being applied beyond its proper domain of
applicability. In and of itself, this is clearly a severe problem for the reliability of the
Hawking radiation calculation in both the gravitational and the analogical situations.
There is a sense in which such models fail the seemingly fundamental test of self-
consistency.
Furthermore, in light of the trans-Planckian problem (which we will use as a
generic name for the breakdown of both gravitational and analogue models at small
distances), it becomes questionable whether the notion of analogue simulation as we
have defined it is really appropriate. Specifically, given these issues it seems reason-
able to worry that both Steps 1 and 2 should be seen to fail, and thus that we have
inappropriately applied our own concept of analogue simulation! Rather, perhaps,
the appropriate philosophical framework for dumb hole models is something like
analogical reasoning, as traditionally conceived. And for this case at least, our efforts
in introducing the new conceptual framework of analogue simulation have been in
vain.
Fortunately, things are not quite as bad as they seem. As we shall see, although not
entirely solved, the trans-Planckian problem can be reformulated such that we can give
precise conditions under which Hawking effect calculations are reliable. The relevant
20
definitions of the modelling frameworks and domains of applicability can then be
appropriately amended, and both Hawking radiation and analogue simulation can be
saved from the trans-Planckian spectre. Before we consider such more sophisticated
arguments regarding the relevance of trans-Planckian effects, it will prove particularly
interesting, from an analogical reasoning perspective, to first consider the chain of
theoretical developments that lead to the formal arguments that will be presented.
Let us start with a key observation by Unruh regarding the differing epistemological
statuses of the two breakdowns:
At wavelengths shorter than the inter-atomic spacing, sound waves do not
exist and thus the naive derivation of the temperature of dumb holes will
fail. But unlike for black holes, for dumb holes, the theory of physics at
short wavelengths, the atomic theory of matter, is well established. For
black holes, a quantum theory of gravity is still a dream. Thus, if one
could show that for dumb holes the existence of the changes in the theory
at short wavelengths did not destroy the existence of thermal radiation
from a dumb hole, one would have far more faith that whatever changes
in the theory quantum gravity created, whatever nonlinearities quantum
gravity introduced into the theory, the prediction of the thermal radiation
from black holes was robust. (Unruh 2008, p.2908)
This is of course a beautiful example of analogical reasoning, perhaps more attractive,
but of the same genus to that of Reid. If we could show that the trans-Planckian
fluid dynamical effects are irrelevant in our model of the fluid, we could speculate the
same may be true with the gravitational case also. Even if we cannot make use of a
precise mathematical relationship between the two situations to make an inferences a`
la analogue simulation, we could use the knowledge that they are similar in certain
respects to make a less reliable inference a` la analogical reasoning.
A specific suggestion regarding modelling of the breakdown for the fluid mechan-
ical case was in fact made by Jacobson (Jacobson 1991; Jacobson 1993) in the early
nineties: one can focus upon the altered dispersion relation (i.e. relationship between
frequency and wavenumber) that is relevant to an atomic fluid rather than continu-
ous fluid, and consider whether, in such models, the exponential relationship actually
holds between the outgoing wave at some time after the formation of the horizon,
and the wavenumber of the wave packet (Unruh 2008). Approximate answers to such
questions can be determined in practice via numerical methods, and it was shown by
Unruh in 1995 that the altered dispersion relation in atomic fluids does imply that
the early time quantum fluctuations that cause the late-time radiation are not in fact
exponentially large (Unruh 1995). Thus, there is sufficient basis to analogically reason
that the trans-Planckian alterations to the gravitational dispersion relationship might
also prove irrelevant to the Hawking effect. However, the situation has in fact proved
much better than this: we can reasonably establish the applicability of full analogue
simulation despite trans-Planckian effects in both systems. Recent work in fact allows
us to generalise from the specific fluid dynamical alterations to the dispersion relation,
to a model with a generically altered relation, independent of the particular cause of the
trans-Planckian breakdown. Of particular relevance are calculations to this end by
Unruh and Schu¨tzhold (Unruh and Schu¨tzhold 2005). Their results represent a gener-
alisation of earlier work by Corley (Corley 1998) and provide a basis for a universality
claim with regard to the Hawking effect.14 Unruh and Schu¨tzhold demonstrate that
14For further work on these issues, using a range of different methodologies, see for example (Himem-
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specific assumptions and approximations can be made such that the role of possible
trans-Planckian effects is factored into the calculation of Hawking radiation, and that,
for such cases, the additional effects are found not to disturb the thermal spectrum as
originally derived by Hawking. The Hawking effect does not, to lowest order, depend
on the details of the dispersion relation at high wave numbers given certain modelling
assumptions.
What is more desirable, however, is a set of general conditions under which such
effective decoupling between the sub- and trans- Planckian physics can be argued to
take place. Unruh and Schu¨tzhold’s proposal in this vein runs as follows: we assume
the breakdown of geometric optics (leading to the creation of particles) occurs in the
vicinity of the horizon only. There the gravitational redshift induces a transition of
trans-Planckian into sub-Planckian modes. Given this assumption, if the modes leave
the Planckian regime in their ground state with respect to freely falling observers15
near the horizon, then Hawking radiation can be obtained (Unruh and Schu¨tzhold
2005, p.8). The condition of the modes leaving the Planckian regime in their ground
state with respect to freely falling observers is then taken to obtain in circumstances
which: a) there is a privileged freely falling frame (in line with the breaking of Lorentz
invariance at the Planck scale); b) the Planckian modes start off in their ground state;
and c) the evolution of the modes is adiabatic and therefore the Planckian dynamics
is understood to be much faster then all external variations.
We thus see that there are good theoretical reasons for a qualified claim that Hawk-
ing radiation is a universal effect. Such claims provide a model-external basis for
both the accuracy of the modelling frameworks and the robustness of the syntactic
isomorphism within the domains of the gravitational and fluid mechanical Hawking
phenomena. However, in order for such external lines of reasoning to count as gen-
uine justification we earlier insisted that they be empirically grounded. How can we
do this for our universality arguments? The answer is quite simple: we can empir-
ically ground the universality argument vis-a`-vis gravitational and fluid mechanical
Hawking radiation, by empirically grounding the same argument as applied to other
pairs of analogue models. Replication of Hawking phenomena could be achieved ex-
perimentally in systems as different as phonons in superfluid liquid helium, or trav-
eling refractive index interfaces in nonlinear optical media. The fact that each system
has a different underlying microphysics then gives empirical reasons to support the
universality claim. This claim then justifies assuming the accuracy of the modelling
frameworks and robustness of the syntactic isomorphism for the gravitational-acoustic
case.
It is important to realize that the universality claim is not a theory replacing the
modelling frameworks themselves. It is not a theory of slow light in dielectric media,
sound in fluids and quantum fields around a black hole horizon at the same time.
The sole purpose of the universality claim is to establish the independence of the
Hawking radiation derivation in all these different systems from possible high energy
physics effects, whatever these may be. And so, once it is empirically grounded, it
establishes the validity of the most crucial implicit assumption in the derivation of the
phenomenon.
oto and Tanaka 2000; Barcelo´, Garay, and Jannes 2009; Coutant, Parentani, and Finazzi 2012).
15For the dumb hole case the freely falling frame corresponds to the local rest frame of the fluid flow.
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4.3 Confirmation of Gravitational Hawking Radiation
All the features of our argument towards the possibility of confirmation of gravita-
tional Hawking radiation via analogue simulation are now assembled. We are now in
the position to make the central, and we believe rather bold, claim of the paper: Cur-
rent and future experimental evidence of Hawking radiation from dumb holes can
provide a high degree of warrant to claims regarding the existence of the phenomena
in gravitational systems. Confirmation in the one case, can be understood as consti-
tuting confirmation in the other. We can proceed towards the establishment of this
claim as follows:
Step 1. For certain purposes and to a certain degree of desired accuracy, mod-
elling framework MS is adequate for modelling systems of type S within
a certain domain of conditions DS.
In our case, a system of type S will be a fluid flow set up. The
modelling framework MS will consist of treating a fluid as a con-
tinuous, compressible, inviscid medium, without relativistic effect,
and under the conditions of being barotropic and locally irrota-
tional, along with the three conditions mentioned in §2.3 – and
then quantizing the linearized fluctuations. The domain of con-
ditions DS under which we consider MS to be adequate for mod-
elling systems of type S for the purpose of calculating an acoustic
Hawking temperature high enough to be detectable under reason-
able laboratory conditions are the ones in which the fluid is set up
with a flow so as to have an ‘acoustic horizon’ of the various kinds
we talked about in Section 4.1. The work in dealing with the trans-
Plankian problem discussed above is sufficient to demonstrate the
viability of the modelling framework for some further refinement
of DS.
Step 2. For certain purposes and to a certain degree of desired accuracy, mod-
elling framework MT is adequate for modelling systems of type T within
a certain domain of conditions DT.
The system of type T in this case is of course the astrophysical
black hole. The modelling framework MT is a semi-classical model
for gravity in which we have: i) a fixed classical spacetime that
features the establishment of an event horizon via gravitational
collapse leading to a black hole; and ii) a quantum scalar field
evaluated in the regions of past and future null infinity which are
assumed to be Minkowskian. The domain of conditions DT is lim-
ited to the times after the collapse phase of the black hole, the
details of which are assumed to be irrelevant. The work in deal-
ing with the trans-Plankian problem discussed above is sufficient
to demonstrate the viability of the modelling framework for some
further refinement of DS. For example the conditions a-c proposed
by Unruh and Schu¨tzhold and discussed above.
Step 3. There exists exploitable mathematical similarities between the structure
of MS and MT sufficient to define a syntactic isomorphism robust within
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the domains DS and DT.
This step essentially follows from the two steps above given the re-
finements of DS and DT regarding the trans-Plankian issue. Given
both theoretical arguments towards universality of Hawking ra-
diation (which do exist) and empirical support for these argu-
ments (which currently does not), we have justification for assum-
ing the accuracy of the modelling frameworks within the relevant
domains, and, furthermore, robustness of the syntactic isomor-
phism.
Step 4. We are interested in knowing something about the behaviour of a system
of type T within the domain of conditions DT, and to a degree of accuracy
and for a purpose consistent with those specified in Step 2. For whatever
reasons, however, we are unable to directly observe the behaviour of an
exemplar of a system T in those conditions to the degree of accuracy we
require.
We want to know whether black holes exhibit Hawking radiation
(presumably to a degree of accuracy that is sufficient for the pur-
pose of warranting various speculations about black hole thermo-
dynamics, etc.) but we can neither create black holes in the lab,
nor probe them via astrophysical observation.
Step 5. We are, on the other hand, able to study an exemplar of a system of type
S after having put it under such conditions as will enable us to conclude
a statement of the form:
ClaimS Under conditions DS and to degree of accuracy that will be needed below,
we can for the purpose of employing the reasoning below assert that a
system of type S will exhibit phenomena PS.
We build an acoustic system of type S that meets conditions DS
and we successfully experimentally measure (confirming it to be
genuine signal rather than noise) the acoustic Hawking Radiation
predicted by MS.
The formal similarities mentioned in Step 3 then allow us to reason from the ex-
istence of acoustic Hawking Radiation in dumb holes to Hawking radiation in black
holes. From this we progress to our key claim: confirmation via observation un-
der conditions DS of the existence of acoustic Hawking Radiation would allow us to
speak of having confirmed the existence of the analogue phenomenon, gravitational
Hawking Radiation. Mutatis mutandis for disconfirmation. Thus we see that so far
as Hawking radiation goes, and given some external support via meega, dumb holes
have the potential to tell us rather a lot about gravity.
5 Prospectus
The dumb hole/black hole case is a powerful illustration of the relevance of the no-
tion of analogue simulation to modern science, and we believe there is a large range
of further possible applications of the idea. A non-exhaustivity list of prospective
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cases is: 1) use of the AdS/CFT correspondence to make predictions regarding quark-
gluon plasma, super conductors and super fluids (Hartnoll, Herzog, and Horowitz
2008; Faulkner, Iqbal, Liu, McGreevy, and Vegh 2010); 2) use of two-component Bose-
Einstein condensates to study cosmic inflation (Fischer and Schu¨tzhold 2004); 3) use
of trapped-ions to simulate neutrino oscillation (Noh, Rodrı´guez-Lara, and Angelakis
2012); 4) there are many applications of analogue simulation in condensed matter
systems due to difficulties in solving quantum many-body problems, e.g. simu-
lating high-temperature superconductors through quantum-dot arrays (Manousakis
2002), quantum phase transitions from a superfluid to a Mott insulator phase through
trapped atoms in an optical lattice (Greiner, Mandel, Esslinger, Ha¨nsch, and Bloch
2002a) and many more16.
Amongst the field of such potential examples, what seems the most straight for-
ward candidate for analogue simulation in contemporary science is the simulation of
one quantum system by another. This general idea goes back to Feynman (Feynman
1982; Feynman 1986), and has rather diverse applications in terms of both quantum
simulation via a programmable quantum computer17 and via a quantum analogue
system.18 Focussing on the latter, the essential idea is to manipulate a well controlled
quantum system – such as atoms in an optical trap – such that the Hamiltonian evo-
lution of a different system is implemented. One then aims to probe the properties
of the relevant Hamiltonian, and in doing so produce experimental measurements of
phenomena whose correlates in the target system are experimentally inaccessible.
A particularly impressive recent example is the simulation of ‘Zitterbewegung’
(trembling motion) phenomena long known to be predicted by the Dirac equation
(Schro¨dinger 1930), using a single trapped ion set to behave as an analogue to a free
relativistic quantum particle (Gerritsma, Kirchmair, Za¨hringer, Solano, Blatt, and Roos
2010). As is noted by the relevant authors, this case bears a strong resemblance to
the dumb hole simulation of Hawking radiation. It is also a good illustration of
the idea of analogue simulation that we have articulated: we have two theories, non-
relativistic quantum mechanics, according to the Schro¨dinger equation, and relativistic
quantum mechanics, according to the Dirac equation. And we have an experimentally
inaccessible novel phenomena, Zitterbewegung, which is predicted by one theory.
Then, in certain very specific circumstances, we have an isomorphism between the two
theories which allows us to experimentally simulate certain relevant formal structures,
the Dirac equation in 1+1 dimensions, and thus reproduce a correlate of the novel
phenomena. Given isolation of suitable meega, confirmation via analogue simulation
could then be understood to function as with the Hawking radiation case. More
detailed investigation of this and other cases will be conducted in future work.
16See (Georgescu, Ashhab, and Nori 2013) for a recent review.
17See (Deutsch 1985; Bernstein and Vazirani 1993; Shor 1997) for key historical developments, and see
(Nielsen and Chuang 2010; Timpson 2013) for general reference.
18See (Lloyd 1996; Cirac and Zoller 2012; Greiner, Mandel, Esslinger, Ha¨nsch, and Bloch 2002b; Ma,
Dakic, Naylor, Zeilinger, and Walther 2011) for more details of both the concept and its applications.
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